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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. 
ERNEST JOE VELASQUEZ, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 17242 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by Information with the crime 
of Second Degree Murder, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
Section 76-5-203 (1953 as amended). Trial was held in the 
Third Judicial District Court on June 2, 1980, through June 
9, 1980. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was convicted of Second Degree Murder in a 
jury trial conducted before the Honorable Christine M. Durham. 
He was sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of five years 
to life in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction and a new 
trial. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Paul Whitehead, the deceased's older brother, was the 
first to discover his brother's body. He testified that he 
was contacted by the deceased's employer and asked to check 
on his brother's whereabouts, who had failed to show for work. 
CT.55) Paul went to his brother's apart~ent several times 
over a three day period, but received no resoonse when he knocke: 
(T. 56-59) He also checked the hospitals and police stations. 
1 
I Finally he and Steve Southwood, who lived in an apartme:·I 
across the hall. ?ained access to the deceased's apartment . 
(T.60) 
through a window. They found Paul's brother lying on the bed 
with a lamp cord around his neck, and a gunshot wound on his 
face through his eye. CT.60,63,220) In addition, there were 
several abrasions on his forehead, which, according to the 
State Medical Examiner, were probably caused by a blunt instnme: 1 
(T.226) A piece of wood was against the bed, and there was 
blood on several walls. CT. 249, 255) Prints lifted from these 
smears matched appellant's fingerprints. CT. 354, 361) 
Some time later, officers from Adult Probation and Parole 
searched appellant's apartment, which was across the hall from 
deceased's apartment. Appellant resided there with Brenda 
Valentine and Jessie Garcia. CT. 177) The officers seized 
an automatic pistol, a magazine, and a box of .~2 cartridges. 
The cartridge case taken from the decedent I (T. 178, 186-7, 207) 
bed was subsequently compared to test casings fired by the 
pistol, and the striations were consistent. (T. 332) 
-2-
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Both appellant and Brenda Valentine were thereafter 
arrested, although charges against Brenda were ultimately dismissed. 
<T. 278, 657) Appellant was confronted with the fingerprint 
match,and denied that the prints were his. (T.300) In a statement 
to the police, Ms. Valentine said that one night appellant 
came back to the apartment with blood all over him, and said 
he'd just "dusted" someone. (T. 654) 
At trial, Ms. Valentine stated she had lied in her statement 
to the police, and testified to the following sequence of facts, 
as did appellant. On Saturday, November 17th, a group of people 
were drinking, playing guitar, and singing in appellant's apartment. 
(T. 427, 513) Around 10:30 deceased followed Brenda into the 
kitchen and, putting his arms around her breasts, told her 
he was going to "get her and screw her". (T. 515, 517) Brenda 
shook him loose, and then went in to tell appellant what happened. 
(T. 431-2, 517) Appellant just advised her to cool down, and 
some time later, after the deceased had gone, Brenda stated 
that if appellant "wasn't going to do anything about it, she 
was''. (T. 435, 517) She grabbed a knife and went over to 
deceased's apartment. (T. 435, 518) The deceased continued 
to proposition her and grabbed the knife from her. She grabbed 
back and cut her hands. (T. 521, 522) When she returned and 
showed appellant what happened, he went over to deceased's 
apartment to try to talk to him. (T. 523) 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant testified that when he entered deceased's 
apartment, the latter had on a mask with a big nose and bushy 
eyebrows, and an electrical cord around his neck. CT. 437) 
(The deceased' s brother later testified that he had seen "little 
kid glasses and nose" when he cleaned out his brother's apartmen: 
(T. 504) Deceased said "how do you like my costume for tomorro". 
Party?", and when confronted with cutting Brenda's hands, e · ~ r sponc, j 
"she's a lying bitch". (T. 438) Appellant then swung at decease:1 
and a scuffle ensued. The deceased hit his head on the corner \ 
of the door, and the two wrestled around the room until appellan: i 
finally knocked ::he deceased out. (T. 439, 440) Appellant / 
g~abbed the deceased by the cord around his neck and his shirt, 
and dragged him onto the bed. (T. 441) Brenda then came in 
with a gun, and as appellant walked out of the bedroom, he 
heard a shot. CT. 443) Brenda testified that she walked into 
the bedroom, saw the deceased passed out on the bed, pointed 
the gun at him, thought about it a minute, then decided "I 
can't do it," shook the gun, and it went off. (T. 525) She 
went back to the appellant's apartment and put the gun in a 
closet.CT. 527) 
The jury returned a verdict pronouncing appellant guilty 
of second degree murder. 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS 
FRUITS OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH OF PREMISES OCCUPIED 
BY PAROLEES. 
Counsel for appellant made a pre-trial motion to suppress 
State's Exhibits 1-5 (Playboy Magazines, . 22 caliber pistol, 
clip, and .22 shells), which were seized during a warrantless 
search of appellant's and Jessie Garcia's (both parolees) apartment. 
The motion was denied (T. 171), and appellant asserts that 
such denial deprived him of his constitutional guarantees under 
the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14, and the United 
States Constitution, Amendment IV. 
The following facts were before the court at the pre-
trial motion. Ernest Velasquez (appellant) occupied an apartment 
across the hall from the deceased's apartment. He had moved 
there after coming to Utah from New Mexico, where he was on 
parole. (None of the testifying officers knew what he was 
on parole for, however. T.34, 116) Jessie Garcia, who was 
on parole in Utah for rape and murder, was staying temporarily 
with appellant. (T. 151) During the investigation of the 
homicide, the police department became suspicious of appellant 
and Garcia, both because of their parolee status, and the 
proximity of their residence to the scene of the homicide. 
(T. 5,6) Having insufficient evidence to obtain a warrant, 
Police Officer Voyles contacted Dennis Holm, Director of State 
Parole Services, and inquired as to Adult Probation and Parole's 
h f lees He suggested it authority to conduct searc es o paro · 
-5-
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would be helpful to his investigation if the parole officers 
could search appellant's apartment. (T. 6,7,19) Subsequently, 
a warrantless search was conducted by six parole officers which 
produced the items of evidence identified as State's Exhibits 
2-5. The parole officers testified that they conducted the 
search because (1) Garcia had offered to secure cocaine for 
an informant, (2) two parolees were living together contrary 
to department policy, and (3) two minor females were observed 
at the apartment. (T. 27) 
In determining whether the search was lawful, the court 
observed that ~arolees have a lesser expectation of privacy 
than do ordinary citizens. (T. 170) Therefore, if a search 
is based on "reasonable suspicion", a warrant need not be obtaine. 
prior to the search. (T. 171) The court held that the facts 
in this case showed a "reasonable suspicion", and relied on 
the three reasons articulated by the parole officers, and, 
in addition, the following factors, to buttress its ruling: 
that neither Garcia nor appellant was employed, that a homicide 
had occurred in the building, that Garcia had been connected 
with violent crimes in the past, and that appellant had been 
a witness to two homicides in New Mexico. (T.169) Regarding 
the issue of consent to search, the court found that neither 
appellant nor Garcia gave it, and, in any event, there was 
insufficient evidence to make a finding of what the "common 
areas" of the apartment were. CT. 157, 172) 
-6-
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Appellant argued and now asserts that either a warrant 
should have been procured, or special conditions of parole 
consistent with appellant's needs as a parolee should have 
been incorporated into a parole agreement so as to authorize 
necessary warrantless searches. (T. 160) Appellant's argument 
is supported by either of two emerging analyses in the case 
law. The first retains the warrant requirement, and the second 
adopts a "middle ground", which allows warrantless searches 
but imposes reasonable limitations thereon, most often in the 
form of articulated conditions of parole. Under either view, 
the search in the instant case was illegal, and the evidence 
seized should have been suppressed. 
A. THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH WAS ILLEGAL SINCE THE 
STATE FAILED TO SATISFY ITS BURDEN OF SHOWING AN 
EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT. 
A warrantless search is per se unreasonable, "subject 
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions." Schneckloth v. Bustamente, 412 U.S. 218, 219 
(1973). And the burden is on those seeking an exception to 
the warrant requirement to establish the need for it. 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The State 
thus had the burden of showing that a "parolee exception" to 
the warrant requirement existed. 
Well-reasoned opinions and cases have recently rejected 
a "parolee exception" to the warrant requirement, and hold 
h h must Conform to standards articulated t at parolee searc es 
d The SubJ·ect was treated in depth in the Fourth Amen ment. 
dl · the case of Latta v. Fitzharris, by Circuit Judge Huf ste er in 
-7-
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521 F.2d 246, 254 (9th Cir. 1975) (dissenting opinion). There 
the majority held that a warrantless search of a parolee's 
home, subsequent to his arrest for possession of marijuana, 
was reasonable. The court found that if a parole officer decidi 
a search is necessary he is entitled to conduct one. His decis~ 
may be based only on a "hunch", but cannot be motivated by 
a desire to harass or intimidate the parolee. Judge Hufstedler. 
with two judges joining her, was unable to agree that a parole 
officer may search his parolee's residence, on a mere "hunch", 
without probable cause and without a warrant. She responded 
to the majority s :~ree justifications for jettisoning the 
warrant requirement as follows. 
First, she disagreed with the majority's propositions 
that requiring a warrant would reduce warrants to mere "paper 
tigers" and impair effective parole supervision. Rather, she 
pointed out that the probable cause requirement is organic 
in nature, and can be modified to accomodate the issuance of 
parolee search warrants. She noted that the developing case 
law in the area of administrative searches reflects a similar 
flexibility. For example, in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 
U.S. 523, 538 (1967), the United States Supreme Court disagreed 
that the issuing of warrants based on "area-wide" probable 
cause for dwelling violations would authorize "synthetic search 
warrants". The Court preferred to modify the traditional probab: 
cause requirement rather than dispensing with it altogether. 
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In fact, the court has dispensed with the warrant requirement 
in the area of administrative searches in only one narrow and 
limited situation. That i's h 1 w ere a warrant ess search may 
be made of business premises by licensed liquor or firearms 
dealers pursuant to statute or ordinance supported by detailed 
regulations. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); 
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970). 
By contrast, parole searches are not conducted pursuant 
to statutory authority, nor are there regulations defining 
the limits of a parole officer's authority to search. Judge 
Hufstedler recognized that without such standards, particularly 
where the need to search varies with each parolee, a flexible 
warrant requirement is the most effective way to fulfill constitutional 
mandates without unreasonably restricting parole supervision. 
She observed that evidentiary support for the probable cause 
showing need not rise to the high standards of Aguilar-Spinelli,
1 
but that it could not be based on a mere unsupported "hunch" of 
a parole officer. The magistrate would take into account the 
nature of the suspected parole violations, the extent to which 
persons other than the parolee would have their privacy invaded, 
and the existence of less intrusive means than a full-blown 
search to meet the parole officer's supervisory responsibilities. 
3 8 US 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United 1. Aguilar v. Texas, 7 . · -
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
-9-
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Second, Judge Hufstedler rejected the majority' s as serti:· 
that the parole officer's intimate and supportive relationshio 
with the parolee is an adequate substitute for the warrant 
requirement, andenough to deter unreasonable searches. She 
acknowledged that while some parole officers maintain ideal 
relationships with their parolees, more often parole systems 
are characterized by inadequate training programs and burdensome 
workloads. A warrant requirement would prevent indiscriminate 
searches which undermine the rehabilitative process. Moreover, 
the warrant requirement does not deprive the parole officer 
of necessary tccls :o accomplish his goals. He or she may 
visit the parolee's home without procuring a warrant, and may, 
if necessary, conduct a search based on exigent circumstances, 
or seize evidence in plain view. 
Third, Judge Hufstedler was not convinced that subsequ~~ 
judicial review of the reasonableness of a search would protect 
the parolee's Fourth Amendment rights or deter future unreasonabi 
searches. She persuasively argued that "the unarticulated 
majority rule is that all searches of a parolee's home by his 
parole officer are reasonable unless the particular search 
later is deemed to have been harassing, intimidating, or too 
overblown." Id. at 259. In effect this creates a presumption 
of reasonableness that may be dispelled only if the defendant 
can establish the unreasonableness of the search. Since the 
search ordinarily has produced incriminating evidence, the 
defendant's burden is heavy indeed. Thus, the burden that 
-10-
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constitutionally rests on the state to show an · exception to 
the warrant requirement is effectively shifted to the defendant. 
Judge Hufstedler rightly concluded that the net result is to 
obliterate Fourth Amendment guarantees for parolees. 
The Fourth Circuit has recently adopted Judge Hufstedler's 
position. In United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787 (4th 
Cir. 1978) the court held that the warrantless search of defendant's 
room by his parole officer was in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
In Bradley, the parole officer received phone calls from defendant's 
landlady informing him that defendant was in possession of 
a loaded firearm. Without securing a warrant (even though 
sufficient probable cause existed to secure one), the officer 
conducted a thorough search of the parolee's room. A firearm 
was seized, defendant's parole revoked, and a conviction under 
federal firearms law followed. The court reversed, finding 
that "Judge Hufstedler' s well-reasoned dissent in Latta .. 
represents the preferable approach," id. at 789, and therefore 
the parole officer was required to procure a search warrant. 
The court discussed the ~majority's reliance on 
the Biswell and Colonnade cases, supra, in which the Supreme 
Court held the warrant requirement to be inoperative, and found 
the reliance to be misplaced. The Bradley court said that 
Biswell and Colonnade represent narrow exceptions to the general 
· d are i·nternally tailored by an authorizing warrant requirement, an 
Admi'ni'strative discretion to search statute or regulations. 
· h b t tute or administrative 
a parolee is not regulated,however, eit er Y s a 
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guidelines. Thus, in the absence of appropriate guidelines, 
the Bradley court was opposed to dispensing with the warrant 
requirement. 
In addition, the Bradley court was unconvinced that 
a warrant requirement would disrupt the parole system. While 
the court was mindful of the important governmental interests 
at stake, it nevertheless preferred to modify the rigorousness 
of the probable cause standard rather than dispense with judici;;~ 
protection that the warrantrequirement provides. The court 
agreed with Judge lfufstedler that "abuse of discretion is more 
easily prevented J? prior judicial approval than by post hoc jud::I 
review." (citation omitted) 571 F.2d at 790. See also 
United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978). 
Several state courts have reached the same result. In 
State v. Cullison, 17 3 N. W. 2d 5 3 3 (Iowa, 197 0) the court grappk 
with the issue of whether a parolee could challenge the evidenti0: 
use of fruits obtained by a parole supervisor's warrantless, 
nonconsent search of his living quarters. In Cullison the 
parole officer went to the parolee's apartment to ascertain 
why the latter had not reported for work. The parole officer 
was aware that "break-ins" had occurred in the area, but was 
unaware of any facts connecting the parolee to them. When 
he found the parolee at home, he attempted to open a locked 
"interior door," and the parolee said he did not want the office'. 
to go in there. The parole officer returned later with a police: 
and without a warrant gained access to the room where he discove:: 
stolen goods. The court held the search to be unreasonable 
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because it was not premised on probable cause. 
A state parolee's Fourth Amendment rights, the court 
Observed, is to be ace d d h or e t e same recognition as any other 
person's. Absent an arrest-attendant search, or any other 
valid exception to the warrant requirement, the parolee's privacy 
cannot be invaded based solely on his status as a parolee. 
The court emphasized that where a parolee stands to be convicted 
of a new crime, as opposed to revocation of his parole, that 
conviction should be based on evidence seized pursuant to Fourth 
Amendment requirements. If it is based on a search and seizure 
lacking in probable cause, it denies the parolee equal protection 
of the law. 
Similarly, the court in State v. Gansz, 297 So. 2d 614 
(Fla. App. 1974), found that the fact that a defendant is a 
probationer2 does not deprive him of his constitutional guarantee 
in the form of a search warrant. In Gansz, the probation officer 
~eceived an anonymous phone call that the probationer had been 
dealing drugs from his house. An ensuing search of the parolee's 
residence uncovered marijuana. On pre-trial motion, the court 
suppressed the marijuana as the fruit of an illegal search 
2. Numerous cases have recognized that there is no sig~ifi~ant 
difference between a probationer's rights and a parolees rights 
under the Fourth Amendment. See e.g. Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 
1235, 1237 n.3 (Alas. 1977); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 
521 F.2d 359, 265 n.15, (9th Cir. 1975). 
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and seizure. Interlocutory appeal was taken by the state, 
and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the officers 
needed to secure a warrant before searching the premises. While 
the court refused to deny a probationer the right to Fourth 
Amendment guarantees, the court nevertheless acknowledged 
that a person's status as a probationer may be considered in 
the determination of whether there is probable cause for the 
issuance of a search warrant. 
Most recently, in State v. Fogartv, 610 P.2d 140 (Mont. 
1980), the c:Ju:-t, relying in part upon its own state constitutiJ:. 
squarely held :tat a search warrant based on probable cause 
must be obtained before a probationer's residence can be searchec 
In Fogarty one of the express conditions of defendant's probatic: I 
provided for warrantless searches, yet the court found that 
such searches could be too intrusive, especially upon innocent 
third parties who live with the parolee. Therefore, the probat'.: 
officer must have a "reasonable basis" to conclude that the 
probationer has violated his probation, and if relying on outsidE 
information must set forth in affidavit form the source and 
its reliability. In addition, the court imposed the requirement 
that the judge set reasonable limitations as to the time, place. 
and manner of the search. 
-14-
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In the instant case, the court found that the evidence 
was insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. (T.170) 
It was because of this insufficieny that Detective Voyles contacted 
Dennis Holm. He admitted that there was insufficient evidence 
to get a search warrant, so he was looking for other ways to 
gain access to the apartment. (T.8) It is precisely this 
kind of abuse which the warrant requirement seeks to avoid. 
A post hoc determination of reasonableness, as the court made 
here, in the face of incriminating evidence in a serious criminal 
case, simply fails to provide adequate protection for the parolee. 
The appellant was placed in the position of having to show 
that the search was capricious, or harassing or intimidating, 
or in some other way unreasonable. The burden is not only 
misplaced, it is insurmountable. 
That the appellant had the burden of showing an unreasonable 
search is apparent from the bootstrapping technique of the 
state in amassing the factors supporting the reasonableness 
of the search. The only evidence of any substance whatsoever 
justifying the search was the information concerning an offer, 
not by appellant, but by Garcia, to sell cocaine on one occasion. 
(T. 143) The informant was undisclosed, and no evidence whatsoever 
of his or her reliability was produced. 
on which to justify a full scale search. 
This was flimsy information 
The other factors, 
together' the presence of the juvenile the parolees living 
girls, and the unemployment of the parolees, could have been 
effectively checked out by a routine visit. The court also lent 
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significance to the fact that appellant had witnessed two 
homicides in New Mexico. This was quite irrelevant, unless a 
parole officer is entitled to engage in all sorts of speculation 
to justify his search of a parolee. And the fact that a 
homicide occurred in the building certainly doesn't authorize 
complete searches of all parolees in the vicinity, no more 
than "break-ins" in the area authorized the parole officer in 
Cullison, supra, to search the parolee's premises. 
Clearly, the only arguable justification for the search 
was the information regarding Garcia's offer to sell cocaine. 
It may be that with a flexible probable cause requirement, and 
a showing as to the reliability of the informant, such inforrnatio'. 
would have justified the issuance of a warrant. In any event, 
that determination should have been made by the judge, and not 
by a parole officer at the behest of a police officer seeking 
to enhance his investigatory alternatives. Appellant submits tha: 
the better rule requires a parole officer to procure a search 
warrant before conducting a search of his parolee's premises, 
and asks this court to reverse the trial court's ruling that 
such a warrant is unnecessary. 
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B. THE SEARCH WAS UNREASONABLE EVEN IF THIS COURT 
ADOPTS THE WARRANTLESS, "MIDDLE-GROUND'' APPROACH. 
While some courts have not extended the warrant requirement 
to searches and seizures of parolees, neither have they been 
inclined to adopt the loose "hunch" test articulated in 
Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F. 2d 246. Instead, they utilize 
a "middle ground" approach to the area of parole search and 
seizure that offers a compromise; that is, warrantless searches 
are acceptable only if they are carefully circumscribed. Decisions 
range from the requirement that a warrantless search is proper 
only if articulated specifically in the terms of parole, to 
the requirement that searches conducted pursuant to an informer's 
tip-off can only be reasonable if the informant is shown to 
be reliable. 
Several well-reasoned cases stand for the proposition 
that a probationer or parolee retains all civil liberties except 
those which are taken away as specific conditions of probation. 
In State v. Culbertson, 563 P.2d 1224 (Or. App. 1977), a probation 
officer received information from a police officer that defendant 
had about 50 pounds of marijuana in his house. Lacking sufficient 
reliable evidence to obtain a search warrant, the probation 
officer and a policeman proceeded to the probationer's residence 
h They observed "remnants where they conducted a cursory searc · 
of marijuana", and were then able to procure a search warrant. 
Upon execution of the warrant, marijuana was discovered and 
the defendant's probation was revoked. 
-17-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In discussing whether or not the initial search was 
constitutionally permissible, the court rejected an absolute 
warrant requirement, and found the Latta rule authorizing the 
invasion of the parolee's privacy for probation-related purposes ' 
to be equally distasteful. The court observed that the Latta ruce 
would allow the decision to search to be completely executive 
rather than judicial, and thus contrary to the intent of the 
Fourth Amendment. On the other hand, the view that Fourth 
Amendment rights are unaffected by probation ignores legitimate 
supervisory needs of the probationer. Consequently, the court 
concluded it would adopt what it called "the middle way", and 
allow warrantless searches only where a specific condition 
in a defendant's probation so authorizes. Since the defendant's 
conditions of probation failed to disclose any special requirerne~'. 1 
affecting his expectation of privacy, and the entry was not 
based on probable cause, the fruits of the search were inadmiss~: 1 
Similarly, the court in State v. R. H., 406 A.2d 1350 
(N.H. Juv. & Dorn. Ct. 1979), rejected the State's claim that 
a juvenile, R.H., lost her Fourth Amendment rights when she 
became a probationer. The court observed that the mere "status" 
of probationer does not work a forfeiture of such guarantees; 
however, the incorporation of specific conditions in the probati.c'., 
agreement may well have such an effect. But the condition 
must be specific enough to clearly and positively inform the 
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probationer of the nature of the forfeiture. The fact that 
R.H. signed a statement acknowledging general rules and conditions 
of probation was not enough. The court thus suppressed the 
evidence found in the unlawful search. 
In Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235 (Alas. 1977), the Supreme 
Court of Alaska was asked to determine the nature and extent 
of a parolee's rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and the parallel provision in the state 
constitution. The court held that a parolee is entitled to 
the same protection as an ordinary person unless a reasonably 
conducted search is required by legitimate demands of correctional 
authorities 3 and is set forth as a condition of parole by 
the Parole Board. The court felt that the Parole Board is 
in the best position to specify when and under what circumstances 
searches are permissible. The court declared: 
[W]e believe that conditions of parole authorizing 
searches should be specified by the Parole Board 
[and imposed by the judge, who would rule on 
proposed charges] and not left to the discretion 
of individual oarole officers. [footnote omitted] 
This procedure.will afford parolees some of the 
protections accorded others before issuance of 
search warrants, without burdening parole authorities 
with the requirement of securing warrants for each 
search. Id. at 1244. 
This guarantee of due process, according to the court, ensures 
that the parolee is protected from undue harassment. 
3. A warrantless search provision in a parole agreement is 
not carte blanche to search without restriction. The search 
must be related to the parole officer's duty to detect and 
prevent parole violations. See People v. Mackie, 430 NYS 2d 
733 (App. Div. 1980). 
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While the courts are willing to allow warrantless searcheo 
pursuant to specified conditions of probation or parole, they 
are wary of sanctioning "boiler-plate" search provisions. For 
this reason, the vast majority have imposed an additional requi::o:j 
that there exist a reasonable relationship between the parolee's 
4 
underlying offense and the condition of parole. Thus, in 
the ~ case, the court noted that a warrantless search provi;:: 
might be permissible in the case of one convicted of a drug 
offense or an offense involving stolen property, to ensure 
that such ac:ivities have ceased. But such a provision in 
the case of one convicted of manslaughter while recklessly 
driving would not be permissible. 
The court in Sprague v. Alaska, 590 P.2d 410 (Alas. 
1980) found a probation condition to be inappropriate. There 
Sprague pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of Burglary and 
was placed on probation. A condition of his probation was 
that, upon request of a probation officer, he submit himself 
and his property to a search for the presence of narcotics 
or dangerous drugs. Despite Sprague's admissions of "drug 
contacts" in the presentence report, the court found an insufficii'' 
nexus between the underlying offense and the condition of probar:· 
The court observed: 
4. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. lf 
Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971); Roman v. Sta~ 
570 P.2d 1235 (Alas. 1977); Seim v. State, 590 P.2d 1152, USo,. 
(Nev. 1979) ["special condition of probation was clearly relatea :.1 
appellant's prior criminal conduct. . . "]; This standard is con 51' 
with ALI Model Penal Code Section 305.13(j) (Proposed Official J: 
1962), and ABA Project on Standards for Crimina! Justice, Stand~ 
Relating to Probation, 33.2(b) (Approved draft, 1970). 
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If we were to uphold the probation condition in 
t~is case, in effect, we would be opening up 
virtually all classes of offenders to warrantless 
searches on less than probable cause. ~ at 418. 
In the instant case, the state failed to introduce any 
evidence regarding conditions, whether standardized or specific, 
that were imposed on Garcia and/or appellant. In Utah, the 
Board of Pardons is authorized to adopt general conditions 
under which parole shall be granted and revoked, and the defendant 
must sign a certificate specifying the conditions of parole 
when he is released. See Utah Code Ann. Section 77-62-7 (1953 
as amended), new provisions Section 77-27-7 (1980); Utah Code 
Ann. Section 77-62-15 (1953 as amended), new provisions Section 
77-27-15 (1980). No evidence of any certificate was produced 
by the state with reference to either Garcia or appellant, 
and the prosecutor specifically stated that he didn't think 
any standard consent agreement existed. (T. 96) Utah granted 
appellant compact supervision from New Mexico, but appellant 
did not sign a Utah parole agreement, nor were any terms and 
conditions spelled out for him. (T. 133) Therefore, neither 
Garcia nor appellant should have suffered the loss of any constitutional 
rights where no conditions of probation specifically removed 
those rights. 
Even if certain conditions could be implied, (although 
the pcosecutor specifically stated he was ~ relying on an 
i~plied consent theory, T. 99) the state failed to show that 
the conditions were reasonably related to the underlying offense 
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We find that the parole officers here were not 
seeking to ascertain proof of a parole violation, 
but rather were acting as agents of the police, thereby 
enabling the police to circumvent constitutional 
requirements. Id. at 786. 
Similarly, in the instant case, the search by the parole 
off ice rs enabled the police to circumvent cons ti tut iona 1 require:,1 
Adult Probation and Parole was contacted by Detective Voyles 
regarding the homicide. Detective Voyles specifically asked 
Dennis Holm about the guidelines regarding searches of parolees. 
(T. 6) He told Holm it would be "beneficial for [his] department'' 
to conduct a search of Apt. 3, the apartment occupied by Garcia 
and appellant. (T.7) He admitted he was looking for other 
ways to gain access to the apartment since he didn't have sufficLI 
evidence to obtain a search warrant. (T.8) Moreover, Holm 
admitted that Voyle asked him to make a search of the apartment, 
but then insisted that the search was conducted for entirely 
different reasons. (T. 38) A realistic appraisal of the evidence i 
in this case leads to the conclusion that the parole officers I 
were acting as agents for the police in order to find incriminac~\ 
evidence regarding the homicide. As the Candelaria court noted: 
[A] parolee's status ought not to be exploited 
to allow a search which is designed solely to 
collect contraband or evidence in aid of the 
prosecution of an independent criminal investigation 
Id. at 786. 
It is clear that the parole officers were not seeking to 
ascertain proof .of a parole violation, but rather were exploiti~ 
... ! 
the "parolee status" of both men in order to aid in the investig,. 
of the homicide. 
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The second factor discussed by courts which is pertinent 
in this fact situation is the nature of the information relied 
upon by the parole or probation officers to justify the search. 
In State v. Simms, 516 P.2d 1088 (Wash. 1974) the court held 
that before a parole officer may forcibly enter a parolee's 
residence without a warrant, on the tip of an informer, the 
tip must carry some indicia of reliability to support an inference 
that the informer is telling the truth. Similarly, in 
Peoole v. Jackson, 385 NE 2d 621 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1978) the court 
held that, while the probation officer was under a duty to 
investigate an anonymous complaint against the defendant, he 
nevertheless acted unreasonably in conducting a wholesale search 
of defendant, his locker, and his automobile. The court noted 
that the probationer had not previously been an unreliable 
probation risk, that the source of information could not be 
assessed, and that other ways existed for checking out the complaint. 
In the present case, no evidence was offered concerning 
the identity of the informant, nor was any evidence offered 
concerning the facts or circumstances from which the informant 
concluded that Garcia had offered to make a sale of cocaine. 
The basis of the tip here may have been nothing more than a 
casual rumor, or worse, a fabrication offered by the parole 
officers to justify the search. In any event, it is not enough 
to support a well-founded suspicion that a parole violation 
occurred See State v. Simms, at 1094. 
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It was error for the trial court to deny appellant's 
motion to suppress the fruits of the search of Apt. 3. Appellan~ 
was entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment the 
same as an ordinary person in the absence of any valid conditons 
waiving his right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. Furthermore, there was substantial evidence that 
the search was little more than a subterfuge for a criminal 
investigation. And lastly, even if the search was conducted 
in order to detect possible parole violations, the information 
advanced to justify the search was unreliable. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE A FAIR TRIAL DUE TO 
CUMULATIVE ERROR WHICH OCCURRED DURING THE COURSE 
OF THE TRIAL. 
Numerous errors occurred during the course of the trial. 
Independently, some of these errors may not have been prejudicial 
enough to warrant reversal. Nevertheless, the cumulative impact 
of the errors was to preclude appellant from presenting an I 
effective defense and obtaining a fair trial. See State v. St._9 
282 P.2d 323 (Ut. 1955). 
A. TWO WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION VIOLATED 
THE COURT'S ORDER REGARDING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE. 
Section 78-7-4, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, provides: 
RIGHT TO EXCLUDE IN CERTAIN CASES. --In an action 
of divorce, criminal conversation, seduction, abortion, 
rape, or assault with intent to commit rape, the court 
m~y, in i~s discretion, exclude all persons who are not 
directly interested therein, except jurors, witnesses 
and officers of the court; and in any cause the court 
m~y, in its discretion, during the examination of a 
witness exclude any and all other· witnesses in the cause. 
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Upon the commencement of trial, counsel for appellant asked 
that the exclusionary rule be invoked and the court granted 
this request. (T. 50,51) 
Towards the end of the trial, Detective Robert Gillies 
testified for the prosecution. (T.671) On cross-examination 
he admitted that he had discussed Officer Voyles' testimony 
with him just before he (Gillies) took the stand. (T. 681) 
Specifically, Detective Gillies stated that Detective Voyles 
told him that he (Voyles) had testified that it was a twenty 
minute drive from the place of arrest (of Brenda Valentine) 
to the police station (T. 683), and that Brenda Valentine had 
been drinking. (T. 684) Counsel for appellant subsequently 
motioned for a mistrial on the basis that the two officers 
had clearly violated the exclusionary rule. (T. 688) The 
court agreed that the conduct constituted a violation of its 
order, but ruled that Gillies' testimony was not prejudiced 
by his conversation with Voyles. (T. 689) 
The law is settled in Utah that a decision as to whether 
a violation of the exclusionary rule warrants the declaration 
of a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
State v. Dodge, 564 P.2d 312 (Utah 1977). In State v. Carlson, Nos. 
16582, 16583 (July 31, 1981), defendant claimed error by the 
trial court's failure to strike testimony offered by police 
officers establishing a chain of custody. During the trial, 
the court was advised that over the noon recess the prosecutor 
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had called the officers into his office to discuss the chain 
of custody of the evidence. Such a discussion constituted 
a violation of the exclusionary rule. This court held that 
the defendant failed to show prejudice by the violation of 
the rule, and thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in failing to strike the testimony. 
Other courts apply the same standard, but suggest that 
certain factors be considered in deciding whether to admit 
or exclude the witness' testimony where the witness has violated 
the exclusionary rule. For instance, in State v. Barboa, 506 
P.2d 1222 (N.M. 1973), the court advised that the trial court 
consider whether the witness' violation was deliberate or inadve::q 
or whether the violation was condoned by counsel. Id. at 1224. 
In the instant case, both Detective Voyles and Gillies 
were (and are) experienced police officers. Detective Voyles 
testified that he had 13 years experience with the Salt Lake 
City Police Department. (T. 245) It could hardly be said 
that the officers' conversation in violation of the exclusionary 
rule was "inadvertant". The court clearly found the violation 
to be error, and considered contempt of court proceedings. 
CT. 688) However, the court's final ruling was that no prejudic< 
inured to appellant as a result of the violation. Appellant 
asserts that even if no actual prejudice can be shown by the 
officers' violation of the court order, the error, combined 
with other errors occurring during the course of the trial, 
entitles him to a reversal and a new trial. 
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B. TWO JURORS VIOLATED THE COURT'S ADMONITION 
TO AVOID TRIAL PUBLICITY BY READING NEWSPAPER 
ARTICLES CONCERNING THE CASE. 
Before the court recessed for the weekend, it admonished 
the jurors to ignore all press reports concerning the case. 
(T.586) Over the weekend, a number of news reports were released 
which discussed the progress of the case. CT. 588) On Monday, 
in an effort to ascertain whether any of the jurors had been 
exposed to the reports, the court interviewed each juror individually. 
(T. 588-608) Two of the jurors, Mrs. Zabriskie (T. 596) and 
Mrs. Bancroft (T. 601) had read news articles about the case. 
On the basis of this misconduct, counsel for appellant motioned 
for a mistrial. (T. 608) The court acknowledged that the 
jurors were wrong in failing to follow the instructions of 
the court, but held that no prejudice was shown, and denied 
appellant's motion. CT. 611) 
It is beyond question that a defendant is entitled to 
a fair and impartial trial, free of sensational publicity which 
has the effect of trying and convicting the accused in the 
eyes of the public. Sinclair v. Turner, 434 P.2d 304 (Utah 
1967). On the other hand, the public has an interest in obtaining 
information of public concern, and in promoting freedom of 
speech and of the press. Id. The latter interest, however, 
is modified as it applies to a jury sitting for a particular 
case, and jurors are frequently admonished to refrain from 
reading and watching news reports concerning their case. The 
court in People v. Lessard, 375 P.2d 46, 49 (Cal. 196~), expressed 
the general principle as follows: 
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There can be no doubt that the reading by jurors 
of newspaper accounts of a trial in which they are 
engaged amounts to a violation of their duty and 
obligation and if such newspaper accounts would be 
at all likely to influence jurors in the performance 
of duty, the act would constitute a ground for a 
motion for a new trial. 
Whether or not exposure to media accounts of a case 
is sufficient to warrant reversal lies within the discretion 
of the trial court. State v. Andrews, 574 P.2d 709 (Utah 1977). 
The court must determine whether the exposure either actually 
or probably prejudiced the jury. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 
U.S. 333 (1966). See also, State v. Knapp, 540 P.2d 898 (Wash. 
1975) . Utah apparently adheres to this standard as well. 
See State v. Andrews, 574 P.2d at 710, ["Defendant did not 
show any actual juror bias as a result of improper publicity 
nor did he show that the publicity was inherently prejudicial."]; 
State v. Andrews, 576 P.2d 857 (Utah 1978), [defendant must 
show "actual prejudice" or a "substantial likelihood" that 
prejudice resulted from refusal to sequester jury]. 
In the instant case, both jurors stated to the court 
that their exposure to the newspaper articles would not influence 
their ability to render an impartial verdict. Thus, the court 
concluded no actual prejudice was shown. Even if no actual 
prejudice can be shown, there nevertheless existed some probabilit. 
that the information contained in the articles influenced the 
jurors. In light of this potential for prejudice, and other 
errors occurring at trial, the appellant was denied his right 
to a fair and impartial jury trial. 
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C. THE COURT IMPROPERLY RSSTRICTED APPELLANT'S 
CROSS-EXAMI'.'lATION OF AN EXPERT WIT:lESS. 
At trial the state qualified Bill Simpson as a fingerprint 
expert and elicited testimony regarding the procedures employed 
~y him in lifting fingerprints from the deceased' s bedroom 
'.·1all and comparing them to appellant's prints. (T. 350, 354, 
361) On cross-examination, defense co\Elsel asked the expert 
·.·1hether he measured the distances between the pain ts of comparison. 
(T. 369) The expert admitted that he made no such measurements 
since he didn't have a "one to one reproduction", and acknowledged 
that such a procedure is common in comparing prints. (T. 369) 
Jefense counsel then attempted to ascertain what effect variances 
in distances between the points of comparison might have on the 
reliability of the print comparison. (T. 369-370) The state 
objected and the court terminated this line of questioning on 
the basis that defense counsel couldn't ask "hypothetical 
questions that contain facts that are not in evidence". (T. 371) 
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in restricting 
defense counsel's attempted cross-examination. 
This court has set out the standard for cross-examination 
of an expert witness in State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218 (Utah 1980). 
There the court stated that an expert may give an opinion based 
on reasonable possibilities within the factual and legal issues 
in the case, out may not give an opinion based purely on 
speculation. Id. at 231. Thus, an expert may render an 
opinion using words like "might have" or "could have", so that 
rhc conclusion "fits the relative degree or certainty to which 
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the opinion is entitled." Id. This gives defense counsel 
the "ample elbowroom" which he "must be allowed" in conducting 
cross-examination. Id. at 230. 
Allowing substantial latitude in the cross-examination 
of an expert clearly comports with the policies behind the 
adoption of Rule 58 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. That rule 
provides: 
HYPOTHESIS FOR EXPERT OPINION NOT NECESSARY. 
Questions calling for the opinion of an 
expert witness need not be hypothetical 
in form unless the judge in his discretion 
so requires, but the witness may state 
his opinion and reasons therefor without 
first specifying data on which it is based 
as an hypothesis or otherwise; but upon 
cross-examination he may be required to 
specify such data. 
Since the expert need not specify the data forming the basis 
of his opinion on direct examination, the cross-examiner must 
have free reign to vigorously test and expose any weaknesses 
in the foundation of the expert opinion. Oregon adopted Rule 
58 as well, and the court in Samuel v. Vanderheiden, 560 P.2d 
636, 639 (Ore. 1977) discussed the shifting of responsibility 
to the cross-examiner under the rule: 
"* * * The premise of the new rule is that 
defective or prejudicial examinations of 
an expert witness can be corrected on cross-
examination. * * * 
"The means available to opposing counsel 
to discredit an expert opinion based on 
a one-sided interpretation of evidence 
are rather limited. He must demonstrate 
to the jury on cross-examination that a 
change in the facts which the expert assumes 
to be true necessitates a modification 
of the opinion, and then later in closing 
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argument he must suggest that the jury 
sh'?u~d not give the opinion great weight. * * *" 
[citing Wulff v. Sprouse-Reitz Co. Inc., 
498 P.2d 766 (Ore. 1972), and Comment 
0 inion Testimon of Exert Witnesses; 
Oregon s New Ru e, 5 Or. L. Rev. (1973) J 
Other cases have also emphasized the importance of allowing 
great latitude in the cross-examination of an expert witness. 
In Timsah v. General Motors Corp., 591 P.2d 154, 164 (Kan. 
1979), the court held that it was proper to allow experts to 
be questioned on other possible causes of hose defects, and 
stated: 
Great latitude is necessarily indulged 
in the cross-examination of an expert witness 
in order that the intelligence and powers 
of discernment of the witness, as well 
as his capacity to form a correct judgment, 
may be submitted to the jury so it may 
have an opportunity for determining the 
value of his testimony. (citation omitted) 
In State v. Hull, 578 P.2d 434 (Ore. 1978) the court noted 
that cross-examination of an expert witness is a formidable 
task and the cross-examiner must therefore be able to test 
adequately the basis of the opinion. The court stated: 
It is proper to test by questions to the 
expert the factual data used in arriving 
at a conclusion and equally proper to elicit 
from the witness that she was unaware of 
relevant facts that may affect the opinion. 
Id. at 437. 
And in State v. Bell, 560 P.2d 925 (N.M. 1977), defense counsel 
objected to a hypothetical question propounded to the expert 
on the basis that (1) the witness did not know what reagent 
was used in a sperm test, (2) there was no evidence to support 
the witness' opinion as to the method of obtaining the count 
f 3) h no test imony upon which the o acid phosphatase and ( t ere was 
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witness could base his opinion as to other possible contributing 
factors to the acid phosphatase count. The court held that J. 
the expert was properly permitted to answer, and that any object'. ' 
by defendant went to the weight, rather than the admissibility, 
of the evidence. 
In the instant case, defense counsel's attempted cross- o 
examination of Mr. Simpson should have been allowed for a number a 
of reasons. First, the jury was entitled to know what relevant e 
information was not available to or considered by the expert 
in arriving at his opinion just as it was entitled to know 
what information was available. Second, counsel was entitled 
to test out the factual data relied on by the expert, and thereby 
expose weaknesses in it. Third, counsel should have been allowed 
to show that a change in the facts assumed by the expert might 
necessitate a change in his opinion. 
The expert clearly assumed that there were no variances 
in the distances between the points of comparison. If adequate 
measurements had been taken, variances might have been apparent, 
and a change of opinion might have been necessary. Counsel 
was therefore entitled to question the witness as to the relevanc:i 
and impact of possible variances in measurement between the 
comparison points. Since counsel was prohibited from fully 
testing the reliability of Mr. Simpson's conclusions, he was 
unable to challenge the expert's competency and the weight 
to be accorded his opinion. This was error and denied appellant 
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"ample elbowroom" in cross-examining the expert. 
Jarrell, supra. 
D. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO STRIKE PORTIONS 
OF IMPROPER HEARSAY TESTIMONY ELICITED FROM TWO 
STATE WITNESSES. 
On December 6th, Brenda Valentine made statements to 
officers Voyles and Gillies at the police station implicating 
appellant in the homicide. (T. 650, 671-2) At trial, on direct 
examination, she admitted that she had lied to them. (T. 529) 
Subsequently, the state called both officers to the stand and 
elicited testimony regarding the substance of Brenda's December 
6th statements. Defense counsel, while failing to object to 
this testimony when it was offered, later made a motion to 
strike it on the basis that it was hearsay. (T.710) Counsel 
argued that it wa-s inadmissible as a prior inconsistent statement 
inasmuch as Brenda admitted that she had lied when she took 
the stand. (T. 710) 
The court denied the motion and agreed with the state 
that portions of the testimony were admissible as exceptions 
to the hearsay rule under Rule 63(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
.. That section provides: 
(1) Prior Statements of Witnesses. A 
prior statement of a witness, if the judge 
finds that the witness had an adequate 
opportunity to perceive the event o: condition 
which his statement narrates, describes 
or explains, provided that (a) it i~ incons~stent 
with his present testimony, o: (b) it 7ontains 
otherwise admissible facts which the witness 
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to set aside a stipulation entered into inadvertently or for 
justifiable cause."] No Utah authorities have been discovered 
by the author that deal with the avoidance of stipulations in 
a criminal context. However, there seems to be no reason to 
distinguish between criminal and civil cases. The standard 
articulated above, therefore, should be applicable in the instant 
case. 
The prosecutor in this case entered into a stipulation 
with defense counsel knowing full well what issues would be 
presented at trial. Appellant acknowledges the fact that Brenda's 
confession was a new development during trial. Nevertheless, 
the cause of death, and the circumstances surrounding the death, 
as shown by the position of the body on the bed, were in issue 
from the beginning. Absent "mistake" on the prosecutor's part, 
on some other justifiable cause, the court should not have allowed 
the prosecutor to renege on his stipulation. While this error 
was probably not independently prejudicial, it nonetheless 
necessitates reversal when combined with other errors at trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant is entitled to a new trial for two reasons. 
First, the trial court erred in failing to suppress fruits of 
an illegal seizure of evidence obtained from a warrantless search 
of the residence of parolees. Second, appellant did not get 
a fair trial due to cumulative error which occurred throughout 
the trial. He respectfully asks this court, therefore, to reverse 
his conviction and grant him a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this ~day of September, 1981. 
R. BROWN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was 
delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this day of 
September, 1981. 
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